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meaning.
na1tiOlllal politics
no
This position, that constitutionther than its decision last term in al truth derives solely from a majorCity of Boerne v. Flores.
ity vote of the Supreme Court's nine
In striking down the Religious justices, has figured prominently,
Freedom Restoration Act, the Court for instance, in the ongoing nationreasserted its role as the ultimate al debate over abortion.
interpreter of the Constitution.
In its 1992 decision reaffirmUnder the Supreme Court's ing the "central holding" of Roe v.
landmark 1803 decision in Mar- Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in
bury v. Madison, wrote Justice An- Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
thony M. Kennedy in his opinion U.S. 833, the Court claimed authorfor the Court in City of Boerne, "The ity to resolve the abortion dispute,
power to interpret the Constitution invoking "the Nation's commitment
in a case or controversy remains in to the rule of law."
the Judiciary."
The Court declared that its "inIt was hardly unusual that the , terpretation of the Constitution
Court invoked Marbury in City of calls the contending sides of a
Boerne, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). national controversy to end their
Throughout its history, the Court national division by accepting a
common mandate rooted in the
Neal Devins is a professor of Constitution."
law and lecturer on government at
The problem is, no one pays
the College of William & Mary in much attention to these pronounceWilliamsburg, Va.
ments by the Court until issues
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arise that have overriding impact
on widespread political or social concerns. And then just about everyone
has an opinion about what the
Constitution means.
As Justice Antonin Scalia has
complained, the justices are subject
to "carts full of mail from the public, and streets full of demonstrators, urging us-their unelected
and life-tenured judges-to follow
the popular,will."
Justice Scalia, of course, thinks
the Court ought to resist such pressures. But the corresponding belief
that Supreme Court decisions are
the last word in constitutional disputes is parochial, shortsighted and
just plain factually inaccurate.
The Court may be the ultimate
interpreter in a particular case, but
not always in the larger issue of
which that case is a part.
Congress, the White House,
various government agencies, interest groups, the general public and
the states all play critical roles in
shaping constitutional values.
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calibrates
to limit political
reprisals. Moreover; when the Court
declares itself the final word on
the meaning of the Constitution,
chances are that it feels especially
challenged by the other branches.
As Ruth Bader Ginsburg observed before her appointment to
the Court in 1993, judges "play an
interdependent part in our democracy. They do not alone shape legal
doctrine .... [T]hey participate in a dialogue with other organs of government, and with the people as well."

In the Beginning
Marbury v. ·Madison, the supposed foundation of judicial supremacy, nicely illustrates how
politics and constitutional decisionmaking are inextricably linked to
each other.
When Marbury was decided,
the Supreme Court and its chief
justice, John Marshall, were under
attack. Court foe Thomas Jefferson
had just been elected president,
and at his urging, Secretary of
State James Madison openly challenged the judiciary's power to
subject the executive branch to
court orders.
Specifically, when William Marbury challenged
Madison's failure to deliv-

.. .
challenge, therefore,
was to craft an opinion that would
support judicial power over the
elected branches while avoiding a
head-to-head confrontation hetween the judiciary and the executive. The solution was to firs.t acknowledge the merits of Marbury's
challenge but then conclude that
the Court was without jurisdiction
to resolve the dispute.
Along the way, the Court was
also able to establish judicial review, holding unconstitutional the
statute. that granted it jurisdiction
in the Marbury dispute.
Marshall's tactics in Marbury
reveal that Supreme Court decisionmaking cannot be divorced from its
political context.
Indeed, well into the · 19th
century constitutional decisionmaking
was

dominated by the elected branches.
Without a body of Supreme Court
decisions to look to, Congress and
the president had no choice but to
engage in definitive constitutional interpretations. And when the
courts did speak, elected officials
were not inclined to treat those decisions as final.
A dramatic example of how the
elected branches controlled constitutional decision-making occurred in
1832, when President Andrew Jackson vetoed legislation rechartering
the Bank of the United States.
The fact that the Supreme
Court had approved the bank's
chartering in McCulloch v. Maryland was irrelevant to the president: "The opinion of the judges,"
Jackson proclaimed, "has no more
authority over Congress than the
opinion of the Congress has over
the judges, and on that point the
President is independent of both.
Each public official who takes an
oath to support the Constitution
swears that he will support it as he
understands it, and not as it is understood by others."
Another insight into threebranch interpretation comes from
the bitter struggle over slavery.
Through Dred Scott v. Sandford,
the Court intended to "definitive[ly]"
settle the issue of slavery. By holding that the right to own a slave was
"distinctly and expressly affirmed
in the Constitution," however, the
Court deepened the schism that ultimately led to the Civil War.
Dred Scott's status as the last
word on slavery was immediately
called into question, most notably
by Abraham Lincoln. For Lincoln,
Court decisions were necessarily
binding on the parties themselves but could not bind
elected government to judicially imposed policy-making.
Otherwise, Lincoln said,
the "people will have ceased
to be their own rulers" if government policies are "to be
irrevocably fixed by the decisions oL the Supreme
Court."
The Court again found
itself under sharp attack earlier in this century for striking
down about 200 social and economic laws, narrowly construing
the authority of both Congress and
the states to regulate commerce
and broadly construing the due
process rights of employers.
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In the mid-1930s, after a number of New Deal laws fell victim to
the Supreme Court's rulings, President Franklin D. Roosevelt concocted his plan to "pack" the Court
with additional justices, presumably
ones sympathetic to his New Deal
reforms.
The Court-packing plan proved
to be a political debacle for Roosevelt, but the Court soon began announcing decisions upholding New
Deal programs.

Justice Owen J. Roberts, a
member of the Court throughout
the 1930s, later said, "Looking back,
it is difficult to see how the Court
could have resisted the popular urge
for uniform standards throughout
the country for what in effect was
a unified economy."
While the Supreme Court often
has issued decisions in reaction to
political or social trends, Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), illustrates what impact the
Court can have when it moves out
in front of public opinion.
Today, it seems inconceivable
that the basic declaration of racial
equality in Brown tested the limits
of judicial authority. When Brown
was decided, however, segregation
was so ingrained in the South that
outlawing "separate but equal"
school systems promised social turmoil and massive resistance. To
minimize opposition in the South,
the justices spoke in a single moderate voice.
Significantly, after the Court's
monumental decision in Brown,
Congress and the executive have
framed most of the debate on racial issues, starting primarily with
48 ABA JOURNAL I OCTOBER 1997

the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The saga of abortion rights
likewise underscores the interactive
nature of constitutional decisionmaking.
As in Brown, the decision of
the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade
served as a critical political trigger.
When Roe v. Wade was decid-

Abraham Lincoln, Justice
John Marsha.ll and Franklin D.
Roosevelt all had their
c'lashes over whether
decisions of the Supreme
Court permanently bind
elected government
officials.

After two decades of resistance
to Roe v. Wade by elected officials
and a significant portion of the
public (and a changing lineup of
justices), the Court eventually returned much of the jurisdiction over this divisive issue to the states.
By repudiating the stringent trimester test from Roe v. Wade in
favor of a more deferential undue
burden standard, the Court in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey signalled its willingness to uphold

state regulati~n-if not prohibition
-of abortion.

Government vs. the Courts

ed in 1973, a vigorous right-to-life
movement had successfully blocked
pro-choice legislation in a number
of states. Consequently, though
polls at the time indicated 64 percent of Americans supported the
liberalization of abortion laws, Roe
nonetheless invalidated the laws of
46 states.
Roe also prompted elected government into action. From 1973 to
1989, 306 anti-abortion measures
were passed by 48 states.
Congress and the White House
also took aim at Roe. Through funding and other restrictions, the federal government revealed its opposition to expansive abortion rights.
In cases before the Supreme Court,
the Reagan and Bush administrations called for Roe's reversal.

Abortion and school desegregation, like slavery before them, make
a mockery of claims that Supreme
Court decisions are authoritative
and final. A permanent feature of
our constitutional landscape is the
ongoing tug and pull between elected government and the courts. Indeed, when the Court invokes judicial supremacy, chances are that
elected officials are breathing down
the justices' necks.
Take City of Boerne v. Flores,
the Court's most recent invocation
of judicial finality.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which Boerne invalidated, was a direct challenge to Court
efforts to limit First Amendment
protections against government conduct that targeted religion. When
President Bill Clinton signed the
act, he spoke unabashedly of "this
act revers[ing] the Supreme Court"
and of his conviction that elected
government's view of religious liberty "is far more consistent with
the intent of the Founders than [is]
STOCK MONTAGE

the Supreme Court." Congressional sponsors of the measure condemned the Court's "degradation,"
"devastation" and ''virtual elimination" of religious freedom.
To Supreme Court justices,
these are fighting words, and, as
such, it is not surprising that the
Court decided to fight fire with fire.
In its decision in City of Boerne, the
Court, after proclaiming horror at
the prospect that "[s]hifting legislative majorities could change the
Constitution," suggests that the role
of elected officials in effecting con-

ernment's most direct link to judicial decision-making is the overtly
political process of selecting and approving federal judges.
These decisions, moreover, support the claim that, in critical respects, the Court's constitutional decisions "follow the election returns."
The Court ruling in Printz v.
United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365
(1997), for instance, which struck
down portions of the Brady Act requiring local officials to conduct
background checks on prospective
handgun purchasers, cannot be dis-

most notably Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
that the Supreme Court does little
more than "prolong divisiveness"
when it "ventures too far in the
change it orders."
Under this view, "in a democratic society," some basic choices about
the identification and elaboration
of constitutional values ought to be
made by the people, acting through
elected lawmakers.
Of course, by passing judgment
on the legitimacy of state laws
outlawing suicide, Glucksburg and
Quill may well affect the content

States' rights entered into Printz, striking down
portions of the Brady Act on handgun registration.

In Planned Parenthood, the Court returned much
of the jurisdiction over abortion to the states.
stitutional change is limited to "the
difficult and detailed amendment
process."
These statements, remarkably,
come from a justice, Anthony Kennedy, who had told members of
Congress that they "would be fulfilling [their] duty'' by limiting the
effects of Supreme Court decisions
that they think are "wrong under
the Constitution."
In fact, several of this past
term's decisions underscore the extraordinary role that social and
political forces play in shaping constitutional values.
On highly charged decisions
that divided the Court, for example, the term was dominated by a
five-member coalition of justices either appointed or elevated by presidents Reagan and Bush (Rehnquist, Scalia, O'Connor, Kennedy
and Thomas).
The decisions dominated by this
group make clear that elected gov50 ABA JOURNAL / OCTOBER 1997

entangled from the fundamental
shift toward states' rights that has
resulted from the 1994 Republican
takeover of Congress and its purported blueprint for legislative action, "The Contract With America."
More striking, in the related
1997 cases of Washington u. Glucksburg, 117 S. Ct. 2302, and Vacca u.
Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, a unanimous
Supreme Court refused to declare
physician-assisted suicide a new
constitutional right and held that
"the earnest and profound debate"
taking place throughout the nation
on assisted suicide should not be
short-circuited.
At the same time, the Court refused to close the door to the possibility that future state legislation
in this area could be upheld.
Glucksburg and Quill reflect
both calls for judicial restraint that
date back to the Reagan administration and an increasing recognition on the part of progressives,

of this populist constitutional discourse. It is a debate that will be
dominated by nonjudicial actors.
Similarly, Reno v. ACLU, 117
S. Ct. 2329 (1997), invalidating the
Communications Decency Act on
"void for vagueness grounds," returned that issue to elected officials.
"There is a magnetic attraction
to the notion of an ultimate constitutional interpreter," wrote political
scientist Walter Murphy in 1981,
''just as there is a magnetic pull to
the idea of some passkey to constitutional interpretation that will, if
properly turned, always open the
door to truth, justice and the American way."
But just as finality is not the
language of politics, constitutional
decision-making, too, is a neverending process. Whether the issue
is abortion, race or the rights of religious minorities, judges and lawmakers are likely to shape the Constitution together.
•
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